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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joshua Michael Nall appeals from the district court’s order denying his
motion for credit for time served.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Nall with conspiracy to commit burglary, promoting
gang activity, unlawful possession of a firearm, and supplying a firearm to a
criminal gang member. (R., pp. 52-55.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Nall pled
guilty to conspiracy and supplying a firearm to a criminal gang member, and the
state dismissed the other charges.

(R., p. 71.)

The district court imposed

concurrent sentences of ten years with two years determinate on each count,
also to run concurrently with an anticipated federal sentence. (R., pp. 88-91.)
The district court did not award credit for any prejudgment incarceration, except
as follows: “If Defendant does not receive credit for time served in Federal
custody, then Defendant shall receive credit for three hundred sixteen (316) days
served in prejudgment incarceration as provided by § 18-309, Idaho Code.” (R.,
p. 90.)
After judgment was entered, Nall moved for credit for time served prior to
sentencing.

(R., pp. 108-16.)

The following facts were stipulated to by the

parties:
In this case, the State served Defendant Nall with the complaint on
July 9, 2013. At the time, Defendant was in custody awaiting
sentencing on federal charges in Idaho. Defendant Nall was
sentenced on his Federal charges in August in [sic] 2013.
Subsequently, Defendant Nall was sentenced in the present case
1

on June 3, 2014. While the current case was pending, Defendant
Nall was in Federal [custody], but he was being incarcerated in the
Ada County Jail while both his Federal and State charges were
pending. Defendant Nall was not transferred out of Idaho until he
was sentenced on both his State and Federal charges.
(R., pp. 111, 118.) The district court found the following additional facts:
The Complaint in this case was filed on July 9, 2013, and an Arrest
Warrant issued the same day. At the time the arrest warrant issued,
Defendant was in the Ada County Jail on a U.S. Marshal “no bond”
hold related to charges in a federal case. The federal hold was
converted to a detainer so that Ada County could take temporary
custody of Defendant for proceedings in this case. Defendant was
sentenced in the federal case in August of 2013, and received
credit for time served toward his federal sentence for the period of
January 1, 2013, through August 21, 2013. Sentence in the case at
bar was pronounced on the record on June 3, 2014. Defendant
asserts that he is entitled to credit for time served toward his
sentence in the case at bar for 316 days that he was in custody
from the time he was served with the complaint and arrest warrant
on July 9, 2013, to the time he was sentenced on June 3, 2014.
(R., pp. 134-35 (citation omitted).)
The district court denied credit for time served, reasoning that “when
Defendant was served with the Ada County arrest warrant in this case,
Defendant was already being detained as a consequence of charges in the
federal case. Accordingly, the Ada County warrant had no effect upon
Defendant’s liberty when he was already subject to confinement for the federal
charges.” (R., p. 136.) Nall filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 146-47.)
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ISSUE
Nall states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Nall’s motion for
credit for time served when the plain language of Idaho’s credit for
time served statute, I.C. § 18-309, mandates credit for Mr. Nall’s
prejudgment incarceration?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Did the district court properly conclude that Nall’s presentencing
incarceration was due to his federal charges and unaffected by the charges in
this case?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Concluded That Nall’s Presentencing Incarceration
Was Attributable To His Federal Charges
A.

Introduction
The district court held, based on existing controlling precedent, that Nall’s

incarceration was due to his federal charges and not the current case, and
therefore he was not entitled to credit for time served. (R., pp. 136-37.) On
appeal Nall claims the statute does not support this analysis. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 7-14.) Application of well-established legal standards shows that the district
court correctly determined that this case had “no effect upon [Nall's] liberty” prior
to sentencing because he was held on federal charges.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts.” State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts “defer to the trial court’s
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.”
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
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Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004).
C.

Nall Was Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served As A Result Of Federal
Charges
The award of credit for time served is governed by I.C. § 18-309, which

provides in relevant part:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom
the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for
any period of incarceration prior to the entry of judgment, if such
incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which
the judgment was entered. The remainder of the term commences
upon the pronouncement of the sentence ….
(emphasis added1).

The italicized phrase means that the right to credit is

conferred only if the prejudgment incarceration is a consequence of or
attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence is imposed. State v.
Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hale, 116
Idaho 763, 765, 779 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 1989).

Accordingly, when a

defendant seeks credit for prejudgment incarceration, “the applicable inquiry is
whether the incarceration was for the same offense or an included offense for
which the judgment was entered.” State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 399, 179
P.3d 360, 362 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing I.C. § 18-309; State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho
67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005)); see also I.C. § 20-209A (“A person
who is sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for time

The quoted language from the statute currently appears in I.C. § 18-309(1).
The statute was amended to add a second subsection in 2015, but the
amendment is not relevant to this appeal. All citations and quotations of this
statute are as they existed at the time of sentencing in this case.
1
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spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that detention
was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed.”
(emphasis added)). “If a particular period of confinement served prior to the
imposition of sentence is not attributable to the charge or conduct for which a
sentence is to be imposed, the offender is not entitled to credit for such
confinement; neither does the sentencing judge err by denying credit under such
circumstances.” Hale, 116 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440 (citations omitted).
The facts of this case show that Nall’s presentencing incarceration was
not “for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.”
I.C. § 18-309. Rather, his presentencing incarceration was for a federal charge
and conviction. (R., pp. 134-36.) As stated by the district court, the current case
“had no effect upon Defendant’s liberty when he was already subject to
confinement for the federal charges.” (R., p. 136.)
In so ruling, the district court relied primarily upon the precedent set in
State v. Dorr, 120 Idaho 441, 816 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991).

(R., p. 135.)

Indeed, review of that opinion shows it is indistinguishable from this case.
Dorr and his co-defendant Hawley were arrested on federal counterfeiting
charges. Dorr, 120 Idaho at 442, 816 P.2d at 999. The state then charged them
in relation to bombings. Id. They were convicted in relation to both. Id. at 44243, 816 P.2d at 999-1000. The district court denied their requests, under I.C. §
18-309, for credit for time served prior to their state sentencing.

Id. at 443, 816

P.2d at 1000. On appeal the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that “[i]f the time
they served was not attributable to the state bombing charges, Dorr and Hawley
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were not entitled to credit on their state sentences for the time they served prior
to sentencing.” Id. (citing State v. Beer, 97 Idaho 684, 685, 551 P.2d 971, 972
(1976)). Furthermore, “any time served in the custody of another jurisdiction on a
different offense does not count toward the sentences imposed for the state
bombing charges.” Id.
Applying this standard the Court held that Dorr and Hawley were “not
entitled to credit on their state sentences for the time they spent in the custody of
federal authorities awaiting disposition of unrelated federal charges.” Id. at 444,
816 P.2d at 1001. This was true even when they were physically held in Idaho in
a county jail “while awaiting disposition of the state charges.” Id. at 444-45, 816
P.2d at 1001-02. This is because when they were “placed in the temporary
custody of Kootenai County, they clearly remained federal prisoners serving time
imposed by federal courts on federal charges.” Id. at 445, 816 P.2d at 1002.
During the time they served in the temporary custody of Kootenai
County, Dorr and Hawley were not denied their liberty because of
the pending state bombing charges. Although they were awaiting
disposition of those charges, their liberty already had been denied
by the federal courts by virtue of the federal sentences imposed
upon them.
Id.
Likewise in this case.

Because at all relevant times Nall was in the

custody of the federal government, he was not denied his liberty as a result of
this case. Because Nall’s incarceration was attributable to the federal charges
(and, ultimately, conviction), he was not in custody “for the offense” for which
judgment in this case was entered. I.C. § 18-309.
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Nall argues that the “plain language” of the statute requires awarding him
credit for time served. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-14.) He bases this argument
primarily on the holding and analysis in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 343 P.3d
30 (2015). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8, 13.) The issue in Owens, however, was
whether the district court erred by awarding credit for time served on only one
count of issuing a check without funds instead of all eight counts Owens was
held for and convicted of in that case. Owens, 158 Idaho at 3, 343 P.3d at 32.
Focusing on the words “shall,” “any” and “offense” in the statute, the Court
determined that credit for time served must be granted on all counts “as long as
the defendant’s prejudgment jail time was for ‘the offense’ the defendant was
convicted of and sentenced for.” Id. at 4, 343 P.3d at 33. The Court in Owens
did not, however, determine that I.C. § 18-309 requires a court to grant credit for
time served when the defendant is in the legal or physical custody of the federal
government on different charges. Ultimately Nall’s argument does not address
the circumstances of this case.
The district court determined that Nall was not entitled to credit for time
served because he was in the custody of the federal government on different
charges. (R., pp. 133-39.) Nall was, therefore, not incarcerated “for the offense
or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.” I.C. § 18-309.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the denial of the motion
for credit for time served.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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